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THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF WELSH
LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE 1980 s
AND 1990 s *
ANDREW EDWARDS, DUNCAN TANNER, #
A N D PATR ICK CARL IN
Bangor University
A B S T R ACT. This article focuses on the advances made to safeguard the future of the Welsh language
under the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. These advancements included the establishment
of a Welsh language television channel, advancements in the ﬁeld of Welsh language education, the
formation of a Welsh Language Board, and, ﬁnally, the implementation of a new Welsh Language Act in
1993. Challenging popular assumptions regarding the nature of Conservative governance during this period,
the article examines the background and context of these developments by highlighting the limitations of
‘Thatcherite ’ dogma not only in ‘ second order ’ areas of policy, but also in a nation where Tory roots were
not deeply embedded.
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party is once again attracting attention. In the
1980s and 1990s, academic interest came largely from political scientists. Some
were concerned with her domination of the cabinet and contribution to prime
ministerial rule.1 Others were more concerned with the New Right ideas sup-
posedly underpinning her policies.2 Historians focused more on the evolution of
her approach from ideas and tendencies evident in the 1950s and earlier.3 For at
least one observer, analysis has been dominated by ‘conviction commentators ’
who, like the nation itself, were divided between fervent supporters of the prime
minister and her equally staunch opponents.4 If the left perpetuated the notion of
School of History, Welsh History and Archaeology, Bangor University, Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2DG a.c.edwards@
bangor.ac.uk
* We are grateful to the University of Wales Publications Committee for ﬁnancial support with this
project and to Rodney Lowe for helpful comments.
# Duncan Tanner, Professor of History at Bangor University, died in February 2010 as this article
was nearing completion.
1 See A. King, ‘Margaret Thatcher as a political leader ’, in R. Skidelsky ed., Thatcherism (London,
1988) ; M. Foley, The rise of the British presidency (Manchester, 1993).
2 See R. Levitas, The ideology of the New Right (London, 1986) ; D. S. King, The New Right : politics,
markets and citizenship (London, 1987).
3 See especially E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (London, 2002), and Thatcher (London,
2006). Now that the archives for the 1970s are open, attention is shifting to the 1975–9 period.
4 G. K. Fry, ‘Commentary : ‘‘A bottomless pit of political surprise?’’ The political ‘‘mystery’’ of the
Thatcher era’, Twentieth-Century British History, 21 (2010), pp. 540–57.
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an inﬂexible dominatrix, Thatcher’s allies fashioned their own illusions, including
that of a leader ‘cast in the mould’ of leaders like Winston Churchill’, the
Iron Lady with cast iron views.5 On account of these shibboleths, combined
with problems of accessing government papers, the possibility of more complex
governing values has scarcely been debated. The main exceptions are studies
by journalists of the 1984/5 miners’ strike, which have used the Freedom
of Information Act (FOI), implemented in 2005, to outline hitherto private
discussions between the miners and the government,6 together with research on
Thatcherite policies in Scotland.7
This article builds on, and extends, recent work on the period since 1979.
It combines central government material for the 1980s, obtained through FOI
requests, with materials from the papers of Tory politicians and other groups,
together with interviews and other sources. It uses this material to examine how
Margaret Thatcher’s governments married strong ideological views with the need
to gain support and deliver a workable programme once in oﬃce. It draws ex-
amples from areas of Conservative policy in Wales during the 1980s and 1990s,
speciﬁcally the development of policies towards the Welsh language. These were
evidently ‘ second order ’ issues compared to trade union power, taxation, or the
role of the public sector, but they still raised issues of principle within the
government. The government nevertheless produced a pragmatic and ‘Welsh ’
response, which clashed with the party’s economic values, the prime minister’s
‘English ’ instincts, and the government’s subsequent record for intransigence
which cannot be explained by the inﬂuences of Tory ‘wets ’,8 nor by the existence
of a ‘Welsh Conservatism’.9
In explaining this development, the article builds on questions raised more
generally by social scientists. Parliament and parties were already in decline as a
source of policy when the Conservatives took oﬃce in 1979, with fairly stable
policy networks and a policy community consisting of pressure groups, public
sector organizations, professional groups, and civil servants exerting more inﬂu-
ence.10 In opposition, Thatcherites had set out to challenge such inﬂuences and
5 See, for example, memo of 12 Dec. 1978 from Saatchi and Saatchi, Churchill College Cambridge
(CCC), Thatcher MS THCR 2/7/1/27. Dennis Kavanagh has likened Thatcher’s personal impact to
that of Lenin. 6 F. Beckett and D. Hencke, Marching to the fault line (London, 2009).
7 D. Stewart, The path to devolution and change : a political history of Scotland under Margaret Thatcher
(London, 2009) ; D. Torrance, We in Scotland : Thatcherism in a cold climate (Edinburgh, 2009).
8 ‘Wets’ was a term used in this period to describe members of Thatcher’s governments who were
opposed to her strict monetarist policies. It was also used, more generally, as a derogatory term to
describe party moderates.
9 There are two studies of the Welsh Oﬃce (WO) in this period, neither based on primary sources:
D. Griﬃths, Thatcherism and territorial politics : a Welsh case study (Aldershot, 1996), and R. Deacon, The
governance of Wales : the Welsh Oﬃce and the policy process, 1964–1999 (Cardiﬀ, 2002). On the weakness of
‘Welsh Conservatism’, see works by the current Conservative politician David Melding, Have we been
anti-Welsh? An essay on the Conservative party and the Welsh nation (Barry, 2005), and Devolution : the battle lost
and won (Barry, 2005).
10 This approach is usefully summarized in D. Judge, The parliamentary state (London, 1993).
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the consensus. They wanted to circumvent and constrain the inﬂuence of the
policy ‘establishment ’ by using think-tanks and special advisers to develop ideas,
together with quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organizations (quangos) and
other bodies to implement such ideas.11 As a result of this alienation of old policy
communities and the growth of new pressure groups in the 1980s and 1990s, the
government faced new pressures from within civil society.12 We know little of how
this process worked. Although political scientists recognize that ‘old’ and ‘new’
policy processes clashed across Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, they have been
primarily concerned with the creation of new policy networks from the 1990s
onwards.13 The idea that Thatcher’s government may have been obliged to
compromise by new political forces merits more attention than it has hitherto
received.
This article argues that the Conservative party’s capacity to implement ideo-
logically ‘Thatcherite ’ policies in Wales was undermined by governing weak-
nesses stemming from changes in the pattern of governance. The Conservatives
did not have a party structure, civil service, or new policy network that could
deliver its policies in Wales. It did not control local government and Welsh civil
servants were often unsympathetic to its aims.14 The government slowly devel-
oped a ‘new’ governing structure based largely on quangos, but those appointed
to such organizations – often, but not exclusively, Conservatives – sometimes
acted against the government’s wishes. The government was also vulnerable to
pressure both from public opinion and from within a Welsh civic and political
elite, especially when opposition political campaigning contested the legitimacy of
(‘English ’) Tory rule. The Conservative party at British level, like many Welsh
Tories, succumbed to such pressure only very reluctantly because it involved
diluting strongly held operational principles. The result was cultural policies
which were hardly ‘Thatcherite ’, and a governing process which did not match
Thatcherite ideals.
I
The Conservative party is not a particularly ‘Welsh ’ organization. In
the 1940s, it tried desperately to overcome its image as the ‘English
11 See, for example, M. Thatcher, The Downing Street years (London, 1993) ; J. Hoskyns, Just in time :
inside the Thatcher revolution (London, 2000) ; A. Sherman, Paradoxes of power : reﬂections on the Thatcher
interlude (Exeter, 2005).
12 Work on this process in Britain has largely focused on the period before 1979; material on
Germany is more useful. See, for example, Christoph Gusy and Heinz-Gerhrad Haupt, eds., Inklusion
und Partizipation : Politische Kommunikation im historischen Wandel (Frankfurt amMain, 2005) ; Hans-Joachim
Lauth and Ulrike Liebert, eds., Im Schatten demokratischer Legitimita¨t : informelle Institutionen und politische
Partizipation im interkulturellen Demokratienvergleich (Opladen, 1999). We are grateful to Alexander
Sedlmaier of Bangor University for these references.
13 See, for example, J. Richardson, ‘Government, interest groups and policy change’, Political
Studies, 48 (2000), pp. 1006–25.
14 For Thatcher’s view of civil servants, Thatcher, Downing Street years, pp. 46–7.
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party ’.15 There were certainly Welsh speaking Conservatives, especially in agri-
cultural areas, whose support for rural life and communities included the pres-
ervation of those communities’ culture and language. In 1953, a report on
linguistic decline amongst second-language Welsh speakers produced a response
from Conservative ministers,16 who proclaimed their support for Welsh language
education whilst aiming to ‘give no oﬀence to forces that may be opposed to it ’.
The government allowed local authorities to determine the language of edu-
cational instruction in their schools, but also gave parents the right to obtain
exemption for their children under the 1944 Education Act.17 Many schools in
Welsh speaking areas taught in English, especially at secondary level, since edu-
cation in Welsh beyond primary level was often seen as either unnecessary or a
handicap. In anglicized areas, such as Newport in the south-east, Welsh had
almost been eliminated as a language of instruction by the late 1950s and there
was vocal opposition to attempts at its resuscitation. In 1958, for example, Lord
Raglan opposed attempts to sustain the ‘moribund’ Welsh language, attacking it
as a mechanism for generating anti-Englishness.18
In the 1960s, electoral considerations generated a reconsideration of the party’s
approach. A private Conservative opinion poll in 1966 showed that 73 per cent
of voters supported stemming the decline of the Welsh language. Although
50 per cent supported greater use of Welsh in education, when asked which
two languages should be taught in schools, only 6 per cent chose Welsh and
English. There were similar responses to questions on the relative importance of
buildings and teachers compared to expenditure on Welsh language tuition.
Support for Welsh language policies was matched by concerns over the costs and
consequences of such initiatives.19
The appointment of Margaret Thatcher as party leader in 1975 was unlikely to
change this approach. Thatcher was a proudly ‘English ’ prime minister :
Scotland and Wales were perceived to be bastions of socialism, where the political
culture and popular expectations needed to be challenged fundamentally.
Devolution was a device for resisting Thatcher’s eﬀorts to undermine the post-
war socialist system.20 Wales and Scotland remained integral parts of Britain.
Under Thatcher, discussions of party policy on Welsh devolution in the later
1970s were generally led by William Whitelaw, Francis Pym, and the party’s
15 M. Cragoe, ‘ ‘‘We like local patriotism’’ : the Conservative party and the discourse of decentra-
lisation, 1947–1951’, English Historical Review, 122 (2007), pp. 965–85.
16 Wales circular 15, 24 Feb. 1953 reporting on the Central Advisory Council on Education (Wales)
report, ‘The place of Welsh and English in the schools of Wales ’, The National Archives (TNA), BD
24/178.
17 Ibid., permanent secretary of the Welsh Department, address in Dublin, 9 Dec. 1957.
18 Lord Raglan, ‘I take my stand’, Wales, 2 (1958), pp. 15–19. We are grateful to Dinah Evans of
Bangor University for this reference.
19 Opinion Research Centre poll, ‘Special attitudes in Scotland, Wales and the West Country’
(1966), Bodleian Library, Oxford (BLO), Conservative Party Archive, CCO 180/29/1/1.
20 Stewart, The path to devolution, p. 215.
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constitutional expert, Nevil Johnson, rather than by its Welsh Policy Group.21
Welsh Tories focused on traditional Tory interests. Nicholas Edwards, the
shadow Welsh secretary, suggested increasing Welsh Oﬃce powers over agri-
culture, since the party was ‘anxious to make political progress ’ in rural areas and
increased powers would thereby address the ‘reasonable ’ aspirations of the
Farmers’ Union of Wales. Edwards wanted to avoid the ‘anti-Welsh’ tag, but had
little to say about Welsh language policy.22 Indeed, Edwards’s role was to high-
light the ‘ tough and unpleasant acts of personal and national self-discipline and
sacriﬁce that are needed to restore Britain and Wales to economic and political
health’.23 Party members in Edwards’s constituency and in other Welsh seats
argued that Welsh speakers had already ‘ taken over ’ the BBC ‘and of course the
Universities ’.24 There was little support for an accommodation with Welshness
from this source – or from others. The party’s Machinery of Government
Committee focused on reforming the civil service and reducing the scale of the
‘Public Service State ’. The committee believed in the ‘devolution of decisions ’,
but preferably ‘ to individuals and if necessary to local government ’, rather than
to Wales as a nation.25 It wanted to challenge the institutions which supported
‘socialism’. Top of the list was reform of the civil service ; devolution did not
feature at all.
Recently opened ﬁles from the 1970s conﬁrm Thatcher’s reputation as an
ardent unionist, the most obvious manifestation of which was her attitude to
devolution. When she replaced Edward Heath as Conservative leader, many
Conservatives expected robust opposition to Labour’s devolution proposals. In
Scotland, she wanted to join in the ‘non-political ’ ‘Scotland is British ’ campaign
and robustly defend the Union, but pragmatically declined to participate.26
Thatcher retained the party’s formal commitment to Alec Douglas-Home’s plan
for a directly elected Scottish assembly, but claimed that Labour’s bill would
create devolution ‘on the wrong lines ’ and hence she opposed it vigorously.27
There were some resignations as a result, but whilst Tory devolutionists like Lord
Hailsham became ‘more and more out of sympathy with the party ’, he and
others remained loyal to the government.28 Thatcher was more vocal in her
opposition to the creation of a Welsh assembly. As she wrote privately in 1975,
such an assembly would inevitably be dominated ‘by the Labour machines
21 Nicholas Edwards to Keith Joseph, 16 June 1975, BLO, Keith Joseph papers 33/1.
22 Nicholas Edwards, ‘Responsibility for agriculture in Wales’, 5 May 1976, BLO, Conservative
Party Archive. LCC/76/109.
23 Press release, 3 Nov. 1975, National Library of Wales (NLW), Aberystwyth, Lord Crickhowell
papers, 2/4.
24 Ibid., See, for example, Captain E. W. Roberts (Fishguard) to Nicholas Edwards, and P. Goodsal
(Clwyd) to Nicholas Edwards, 2 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1975.
25 Policy Group on the Machinery of Government, interim report (by J. L. Barnes), 9 May 1977,
CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/6/1/49.
26 Thatcher to Charles Ball, (n.d. but Feb. 1978), CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/6/1/89.
27 Thatcher to Gould, 5 Jan. 1977, CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/6/1/88.
28 Hailsham to A. Maude, 12 Dec. 1976 (unsent), CCC, Hailsham papers.
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of Gwent and Glamorgan’, whose past performance did not justify giving an
assembly ‘vast powers and patronage ’. Having an assembly would also turn the
secretary of state for Wales into its ‘messenger boy’.29 There was little pressure
from Thatcher’s team to court opinion and become more sympathetic to dis-
tinctive Welsh cultural claims. Tory policies on trade unions, nationalization,
crime, and the economy were demonstrably popular, party oﬃcials argued, even
in Wales, where the ‘great majority of the population realize how closely their
interests are tied up with the rest of the United Kingdom’.30 Whilst opinion was
more favourable to devolution in Scotland, Thatcher’s pollsters advised her
against making an issue of devolution when other issues, such as housing and
vandalism, played in their favour.31
Intervening to protect the Welsh language – as required by nationalist protes-
ters – did not ﬁt with the Thatcherite view that people should decide their own
fate (or the fate of their culture). The party’s Welsh manifesto in 1979 made its
position abundantly clear : ‘ the problems of Wales ’, it proclaimed, were ‘very
much those of the United Kingdom as a whole ’. The ‘special characteristics ’
of Wales, the ‘Welsh predicament ’, were all caused by the ‘bleak inheritance ’
bequeathed by socialism. The Welsh language was discussed mainly in terms of
educational provision, and proclaimed a matter of individual choice. Attention
was, however, focused on the ‘sadly misguided’ people attempting ‘ to create an
atmosphere of hatred and contempt for English inﬂuences ’ by seeking to make
Welsh language education compulsory.32
The 1979 election results demonstrated the importance of British, rather than
Welsh, concerns. The Conservatives won an additional six parliamentary seats at
the 1979 general election in Scotland. In Wales, the party gained proportionally
more votes than in Scotland, nearly a third of the total, despite obtaining fewer
seats. Similarly, the referenda on devolution in March 1979 did not produce a
suﬃciently large majority in Scotland for legislation to be enacted and, in Wales,
devolution was also defeated because it attracted less than a quarter of the
popular vote.33
These facts are often passed over on account of subsequent events. The
Conservatives’ electoral position was gradually eroded, until in 1997 not a single
Conservative MP was returned in either Wales or Scotland. In the intervening
period, Conservative policies inadvertently enhanced support for devolution,
29 Marginal comments on a devolution brieﬁng, n.d. but Nov. 1975, CCC, Thatcher papers,
2/6/90.
30 Brieﬁng by C. Ogg on a Marplan poll of 20 Oct. 1976, CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/7/1/85;
R. Ryder to A. S. Garner, 31 Mar. 1977, CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/6/1/274; for Welsh interests,
brieﬁng for Margaret Thatcher by D. Dear, 15 May 1975, CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/6/1/91.
31 The report is with K. Britto to R. Ryder, 29 June 1978, CCC, Thatcher papers, 2/6/1/89.
32 Conservative Manifesto for Wales 1979.
33 In the 1979 referenda on 1 Mar. 1979, Scottish voters approved devolution by a margin of 52 to
48 per cent. However, only 32.9 per cent of the total electorate voted in favour, 7.1 per cent short of the
40 per cent margin required for the legislation to progress. In Wales, only one ﬁfth of voters supported
the proposal.
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which gained majority support in Wales and Scotland in further referenda on
devolution in 1997.34 The run-down of coalmining and other heavy industries,
introduction of the so-called ‘poll tax ’, combined with assaults on Scottish edu-
cational diﬀerences, created an impression that Thatcherism was, at best, the
imposition of uniformity with England and, at worst, English colonialism. In
Wales, being passionately anti-Conservative became a deﬁning feature of Welsh
national identity.35 Paradoxically, however, Conservative policy on the Welsh
language during the same period was progressive and interventionist and became
the cornerstone of subsequent Welsh language policy. Indeed, a similar combi-
nation of approaches has been used to support minority languages around
the world.36 Such policies were the subsidized development of Welsh language
television through the formation of the Welsh ‘ fourth ’ television channel ; the
establishment of a statutory Welsh Language Board (WLB) in 1988, with a remit
to protect and develop the Welsh language ; the 1988 Education Reform Act,
which led gradually to the Welsh language becoming a compulsory part of the
school curriculum and, ﬁnally, the passing of a Welsh Language Act in 1993,
which placed an onus on the public sector to treat Welsh and English equally.
Little has been written on Conservative policy by historians of the Welsh lan-
guage,37 whilst socio-linguists, sociologists, and geographers have tended to focus
more on the implications and impact of language policy than on the reasoning
behind the legislation.38 Most Welsh political scientists have become preoccupied
with the post-devolution era, seldom venturing back to the situation before New
Labour’s constitutional changes. Conservative secretaries of state for Wales and
their political allies have, however, been keen to take the credit for these in-
itiatives, alongside other departures from Thatcherite policies. Whilst playing
down diﬀerences between his views and those of Thatcher, Nicholas Edwards
himself has stressed how his policies as Welsh secretary of state between 1979 and
1987 laid foundations for subsequently distinctive Welsh policy decisions.39 His
successor, Peter Walker, goes further in arguing that he constructed anti-
Thatcherite Welsh policies because he disagreed with Thatcher’s views. Walker
34 In the 1997 referenda, 74.3 per cent of Scottish voters and 50.3 per cent of Welsh voters supported
the government’s proposals.
35 R. W. Jones, R. Scully, and D. Trystan, ‘Why the Conservatives do (even) worse in Wales? ’, in
L. Bennie, C. Rallings, J. Tonge, and P. Webb, eds., British parties and elections review, XII (London, 2002),
p. 243.
36 See C. H. Williams, ‘Articulating the horizons of Welsh’, in C. H. Williams, ed., Language and
governance (Cardiﬀ, 2007).
37 For a partial exception, J. G. Jones, ‘The attitude of political parties towards the Welsh lan-
guage’, in G. H. Jenkins and M. A. Williams, eds., Let’s do our best for the ancient tongue : the Welsh language
in the twentieth century (Cardiﬀ, 2000), pp. 249–77.
38 Examples include J. Aitcheson and H. Carter, A geography of the Welsh language, 1961–1991 (Cardiﬀ,
1994) ; G. Williams and D. Morris, Language planning and language use : Welsh in a global age (Cardiﬀ, 2000),
and C. H. Williams, ‘ Iaith Pawb: the doctrine of plenary inclusion’, Contemporary Wales, 17 (2005),
pp. 1–28; C. H. Williams, Called unto liberty : on language and nationalism (Clevedon, 1994), and Linguistic
minorities in democratic context (Basingstoke, 2007).
39 N. Crickhowell, Westminster, Wales and water (Cardiﬀ, 1999).
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suggests that he was appointed secretary of state for Wales because he was pre-
pared to challenge Thatcherite economic policies and only accepted the job on
the condition that he could do it ‘his way’ ; even Labour trade unionists felt that
Walker’s was a very diﬀerent style of leadership from that of the prime minister.40
The minister of state throughout this period, Wyn Roberts, has also stressed his
contribution as the only Welsh speaker in the governing group.41
Such views seriously overstate the inﬂuence of government ministers on the
direction of policy, as opposed to its detail or timing. As Dylan Griﬃths has
rightly concluded in a little-read contemporary account of the Welsh Oﬃce, the
‘main source of policy ideas for the Welsh Oﬃce is not Wales itself but the centre,
the Cabinet, the prime minister, Whitehall and Westminster ’.42 Even where a
secretary of state entertained an alternative vision, their powers were limited,
whilst all of the Welsh secretaries of state were, to varying degrees, sympathetic
towards their government’s policies during this period, irrespective of subsequent
claims or protestations. Nor could secretaries of state depend on the Welsh
Conservative party to produce a ‘wet ’ alternative, since it had neither the ca-
pacity nor the inclination to do so. Welsh secretaries of state did not ‘ lead’ Welsh
Tories with policies substantially diﬀerent from the national line ; indeed, when
individual Welsh Tory MPs disagreed with the prime minister, the party in
Wales rallied to its national leader. The erstwhile chair of the Welsh Conservative
party, Beata Brookes, has described the dissident Welsh MP, Anthony Meyer,
who challenged Thatcher for the party leadership, as ‘never really a true
Conservative ’ and one of the ‘old school ’, a friend of Edward Heath’s who may
have resented taking orders from a woman and thus ‘wanted to vent his hatred by
demeaning her ’. Brookes confesses to having been ‘a Thatcher fan’ and a ‘ total
supporter of Margaret Thatcher ’, who respected her courage, strength, and sin-
gle-mindedness both as a woman and as a leader. Wyn Roberts claims to have
objected to some Thatcherite policies, such as the poll tax, but ‘ still felt bound to
Margaret by a [sic] umbilical cord ’ and ‘never wavered in my support for her ’.43
Both Walker and David Hunt, who succeeded Walker in 1990, were imported to
the Welsh Oﬃce from outside Wales, and were more inclined than Edwards to
take advice on Welsh concerns. Nonetheless, there is nothing to suggest the
existence of a clear Tory policy or a ‘vision’ for Wales. Interventions by indi-
vidual Welsh Tories were inﬂuential at particular moments, but the pressure of
40 P. Walker, Staying power : an autobiography (London, 1991), p. 203; D. Jenkins, ‘Sleeping with the
enemy: trades unions in Wales during the Thatcher years ’, Welsh Political Archive lecture, National
Library of Wales, 2007.
41 Lord Roberts of Conwy, Right from the start (Cardiﬀ, 2006) ; Geraint Morgan MP, ‘HowWelsh are
the Welsh Conservatives? ’, Planet, 54 (Dec. 1985/Jan. 1986), pp. 60–5.
42 Griﬃths, Thatcherism, p. 164.
43 Interview with Beata Brookes, Cymru 2000 archive, Bangor University, and Roberts, Right from
the start, p. 237; Meyer stood against Thatcher for the leadership of the party in 1989. See his appro-
priately titled memoir, Stand up and be counted (London, 1990).
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external inﬂuences was easily as signiﬁcant as pressure from within the
Conservative party in explaining the policies that were introduced.
I I
To appreciate such pressures, we need to understand the position of the Welsh
language by the 1970s. Concern for the fate of the Welsh language had grown
since the 1920s, but campaigning groups felt that worries over its decline had
escalated substantially during the 1930s and 1940s. Census ﬁgures in 1951 showed
such fears to be valid, with the number of Welsh speakers having fallen to 28.9 per
cent (from 36.8 per cent in 1931). The Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, was
joined by a series of politically unaligned civic ﬁgures to become part of a ‘ liberal
nationalist ’ tradition which was a feature of the governing polity.44 By the 1950s,
the Welsh Boards of Health and Education contained many politically motivated
Welshmen like Ben Bowen Thomas, permanent secretary of the Welsh Board of
Education, whose circulars enabled local authorities to provide Welsh language
education. In Welsh speaking areas, there was also pressure from parish councils
and other bodies for the provision of oﬃcial forms and literature in the Welsh
language.45 Census ﬁgures in 1961 showed, however, that these quiet pressures
had been unsuccessful since the proportion of Welsh speakers had fallen still
further to just 26 per cent.46
What followed was an iconic moment in nationalist mythology. In 1962, a
radio broadcast by one of the founders of Plaid Cymru, Saunders Lewis,
explicitly addressed these ﬁgures. Lewis called for a crusading movement of
popular activism and protest which led directly to the formation of Cymdeithas
yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society), and to a decade of campaigns in
favour of bilingual roadsigns and other changes, based around direct action ra-
ther than parliamentary politics.47 From the 1950s onwards, the leader of Plaid
Cymru, Gwynfor Evans, had also put the language campaign at the forefront of
his many populist interventions.48 In 1963, the Conservative government initiated
an oﬃcial inquiry to ‘clarify the legal status of the Welsh language ’ and to
‘consider whether any changes in the law ought to be made’. When an oﬃcial
report of the committee’s ﬁndings was published in 1965, it recommended that
the status of the Welsh language for legal and administrative purposes should be
44 W. Griﬃth, ‘Devolutionist tendencies in Wales, 1885–1914’, in D. Tanner, C. Williams, W. P.
Griﬃth, and A. Edwards, eds., Debating nationhood and governance in Britain, 1885–1939 (Manchester, 2006),
pp. 89–118.
45 See M. E. Wiliam, ‘Hunaniaeth a Moderneiddio yng Nghymru, c.1950–1962: Yr ymadwaith
diwylliannol rhwng ‘‘Prydeindod’’ a ‘‘Chymreictod’’, gyda sylw penodol i ogled ddwyrain Cymru’,
(Ph.D. thesis, Bangor, 2008), pp. 192–270. Forms included applications for vehicle excise duty and
television licences. 46 Aitcheson and Carter, A geography, p. 50.
47 P. Merrimen and R. Jones, ‘Symbols of justice: the Welsh Language Society’s campaign for
bilingual roadsigns in Wales, 1967–1980’, Journal of Historical Geography, 35 (2009), pp. 350–75; for the
Welsh Language Society, D. Phillips, Trwy Ddulliau Chwyldro…? Hanes Cymdeithas yr Iaith 1962–1992
(Llandysul, 1998). 48 R. Evans, Gwynfor Evans : portrait of a patriot (Talybont, 2008).
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raised and clariﬁed.49 The incoming Labour government responded to the report
by passing a Welsh Language Act in 1967 which guaranteed the right to use
Welsh more widely in court and also provided for its use in public administration.
Despite this new legislation, together with increased funding for Welsh language
nurseries, schools, and books, the proportion of Welsh speakers was nevertheless
falling unchecked as census ﬁgures in 1971 again revealed.50 The Welsh language
campaigns led to a sharp political response. During the 1979 Welsh devolution
referendum campaign, the Labour MP, Leo Abse, whipped up fears that devol-
ution would privilege Welsh speakers from north Wales in employment terms. If
Wales was a nation, it was perhaps a nation divided by language.51
By 1980, Edwards was claiming that the Conservatives had done more than
any other government administration to address the decline of the Welsh lan-
guage. Edwards cited support for Welsh language schools in the 1950s, the for-
mation of committees which had reported positively on the need for a Welsh
language act and on bilingual roadsigns in the 1960s, together with Peter
Thomas’s role in forming the ‘Council for the Welsh language ’ in the 1970s.
Edwards nevertheless detected an ‘unreality ’ about language activists and their
support for a universal bilingualism. He stressed ‘ individual and local choice ’, the
importance of voluntary bodies in developing demand for Welsh in education,
and ‘ the over-riding need to act in accordance with the wishes and desires of the
people of Wales ’.52 By contrast, what became the four planks of language legis-
lation (the fourth channel, the establishment of the WLB, Welsh education pro-
vision, and a Welsh Language Act) in fact emerged through a mixture of
inﬂuences, cumulatively exposing a lack of a vision, or method, for governing
Wales.
The disjunction between Edwards’s thoughts and the ideas of those concerned
primarily with Welsh language and culture became evident during the develop-
ment of the ﬁrst of these episodes : the conﬂict over a Welsh language ‘ fourth ’
television channel in 1980–2. The problems that emerged proved a harsh learning
experience for the Conservatives, and hence the fourth channel debate had a
much larger impact. In a rare concession to Welsh opinion, the Conservative
party manifesto of 1979 had stated that in Wales, the equivalent of Channel 4 in
England would contain all the Welsh language programming when the new
fourth channel started. Shortly after the general election, however, the home
secretary, Whitelaw, insisted that this commitment be rescinded. Instead, Welsh
49 WO, Legal status of the Welsh language : report of the committee under the chairmanship of Sir David Hughes
Parry, Q.C., LL. D., D. C. L., 1963–65 (HMSO, 1965).
50 The 1971 census revealed that the number of Welsh speakers had fallen by 5.1 per cent in the
space of a decade (from 26.0 per cent in 1961 to 20.9 per cent).
51 See D. Foulkes, J. B. Jones, and R. A. Wilford, eds., The Welsh veto : the Wales Act 1978 and the
referendum (Cardiﬀ, 1983), pp. 125–6.
52 ‘The Welsh language: a commitment and challenge: the government’s policy for the Welsh
language. ’ Speech by Nicholas Edwards to Gwynedd County Council Llanrwst, 15 Apr. 1980, NLW,
Crickhowell papers 2–7.
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language programming was to be spread across both the BBC and ITV. The
Tories’ surprisingly substantial election victory was seen as an opportunity to
rescind a pragmatic manifesto commitment.53 The decision was decreed by the
home secretary and the chancellor of the exchequer ; Edwards was not even
consulted. Whitelaw argued that a single channel would have required a huge
subsidy; at the Treasury, John Biﬀen also argued that a ‘Welsh ’ channel would
be a commercial liability.54 Westminster attitudes may have been inﬂuenced by
pressures from both HTV55 and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA),
who were both concerned about the risk of running a service with little mass
appeal if the new channel – Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C) (Channel Four
Wales) – collapsed. Commercial channels that were ﬁnancially self-suﬃcient now
became a part of the Conservative’s cultural hostility to what they perceived to be
a bloated and distant public sector. If the Conservatives were worried that people
would ‘ turn their aerials to English stations ’ to avoid receiving Welsh language
programmes,56 rank-and-ﬁle Tories from Pembrokeshire (Edwards’s constitu-
ency) voiced distaste at this prospect in the disdainful tones of an emphatically
English Conservatism.
The Home Oﬃce policy shift was sprung on the Welsh Oﬃce in July 1979.
Edwards himself complained bitterly to Whitelaw, writing that he was ‘ frankly
astonished’ to receive proposals ‘without any consultation with me or my
Department ’, and again observing that the proposals ‘will create the most pro-
found political problems in Wales ’.57 It was, however, the political obstacles and
the personal insult to which he objected, rather than the policy. The senior Welsh
Oﬃce civil servant, Dr R. H. Jones, shared Edwards’s irritation, complaining
that the secretary of state had been presented with a ‘ fait accompli ’ which was
‘ intolerable ’. Jones argued, however, that, if adopted, the proposals would ‘cause
considerable embarrassment ’, prompting calls for a pragmatic response, rather
than one which accorded with principles developed by the party in opposition.
Welsh Conservative MPs were sensitive to such claims, having developed new
hopes of building support in Wales following the election victory in 1979. In
January 1980, the Welsh speaking Conservative MP, Geraint Morgan, was part of
a cross-party delegation representing a ‘ large body of opinion in Wales ’ that
wanted a ‘ fourth channel ’. Morgan argued that ‘many people in Wales had voted
53 Evans, Gwynfor Evans, p. 504 n. 30.
54 J. Biﬀen to W. Whitelaw, 2 Nov. 1979, NLW Crickhowell MS 2–7, WO website, FOI releases.
www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/foi/foi-20050616.html, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010. Where documents
released under FOI have since been made available on the Wales Oﬃce website we have used the web
address.
55 HTV was an independent television company, formed in 1970. The company’s name derived
from its predecessor, Harlech Television. The company was re-named ITV West and Wales in 2006.
56 ‘Note of a meeting between the secretary of state and Lady Plowden (chairman, IBA)’, 30 July
1979, WO website, FOI releases. www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/foi/foi-20050616.html, accessed on
7 Sept. 2010.
57 R. H. Jones to P. J. Hosegood, 16 July 1979, TNA, BD 25/327; Nicholas Edwards to Willie
Whitelaw, n.d., cited in Evans, Gwynfor Evans, p. 399.
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for the Conservative party in the belief that they would institute a Welsh language
channel ’.58 Keith Best, MP for Anglesey, with its large Welsh speaking popu-
lation, and various Tory peers, also indicated that they could not accept party
policy, as did the Welsh select committee, with its chair, Leo Abse, transformed
into an unlikely defender of the Welsh language.59
The most dramatic protest was Gwynfor Evans’s statement that he would fast
until the government relented or he died. Thatcher herself was temperamentally
opposed to conceding in such circumstances ; public protests on language and
other issues by Welsh demonstrators were common, and simply reinforced de-
termination.60 Edwards agreed, claiming that it was ‘ impossible to surrender to
such blackmail ’.61 He added that ‘apart from a powerful articulate minority,
there was no great interest in the subject ’ – which made the ‘blackmail ’ even less
persuasive.62
Various eﬀorts were made to dissuade Evans from seeking, as oﬃcials put it,
‘ the martyr’s crown’.63 Keen to extend the party’s basis of support, Plaid Cymru
MPs Dafydd Elis Thomas and Dafydd Wigley objected to the ways in which
language was again dominating their party’s image and policy and privately
suggested a committee to ‘ join up’ provision spread over two television channels
and to oversee its quality.64 Internal pressure was also mobilized. In September
1980, a delegation of civic leaders, including Cledwyn Hughes, Labour’s secretary
of state for Wales 1966–8 and now a member of the Lords, Goronwy Daniels (vice
chancellor of Aberystwyth University and, politically, a Liberal), and the arch-
bishop of Wales, oﬀered a face-saving compromise : a single channel for a two-
year trial period.65 Such internal pressure was, however, presented as a decisive
intervention by the government. In fact, Edwards had been warned by one senior
Welsh Oﬃce ﬁgure that ‘ the tide of public opinion ’ was turning against the
58 ‘Note of a meeting held on 21 Jan. 1980, Welsh Language Broadcasting’, WO website, FOI
releases, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept.
2010. 59 Evans, Gwynfor Evans, p. 420.
60 For examples, Western Mail, 25 Sept. 1981, 14 June 1983. Nicholas Edwards was regularly pelted
with rotten eggs. See e.g. Cambrian News, 9 Mar. 1984; Daily Post, 12 Mar. 1984; Western Mail, 3 and
30 Mar. 1984; Daily Telegraph, 3 Mar. 1984. This helped ensure that they felt like colonial rulers in an
inhospitably radical land.
61 ‘Note of a meeting held on 21 Jan. 1980, Welsh language broadcasting’, and ‘Note of a meeting
on Fourth Channel/Welsh Language-Broadcasting Bill ’ 1 July 1980, WO website, FOI releases,
www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
62 ‘Note of a meeting held on 29 July 1980: Welsh Language Broadcasting’, www.walesoﬃce.
gov.uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
63 WO oﬃcial (name redacted), ‘Conﬁdential memorandum for the secretary of state’, 9 Sept.
1980, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
64 ‘Conﬁdential minute’ (author’s name redacted), 28 May 1980, and ‘Note of a meeting on Fourth
channel/Welsh language broadcasting’, 27 June 1980, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/06/16/
establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
65 ‘Deputation on Welsh language broadcasting’, 9 Sept. 1980, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/06/
16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010. See also Nicholas Edwards interview,
Cymru 2000 archive, Bangor University.
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government.66 Whitelaw informed Thatcher that ‘opinion in the Conservative
party in Wales was now ﬁrmly in favour of going back to the manifesto
positions ’.67 Hence the decision was reluctantly reversed. This distinctly un-
Thatcherite response was possible partly because Wales was not particularly
important to the government, and partly because ‘moderate ’ Welsh speaking
Wales was seen as a potential ally and moderates apparently saw government
policy as unreasonable.68 Nevertheless, it proved a diﬃcult and embarrassing
experience for a party whose image was based on remaining resolute. This re-
versal was not due to ‘wets ’ in London or Cardiﬀ obstructing Thatcher, since
most of those involved supported her stance. Rather, it was a conscious decision
by Thatcherites to accommodate the opposition.
I I I
A second decisive episode occurred after the Conservatives’ second general
election victory in 1983, when academic analysis and contemporary commentary
suggest that the prime minister’s hold on power had strengthened. The govern-
ment had already moved to restrict the ﬁnancial powers of local government in
Wales, as elsewhere. Despite the prime minister’s determined confrontation with
coalminers during the 1984/5 strike, concessions on the Welsh language never-
theless continued. In this type of area, the party did not have the capacity to
establish quangos which it could control, whilst Welsh civil society – and tra-
ditional areas of inﬂuence like the civil service – continued to exert a strong in-
ﬂuence. Although Tories could become the voice of such movements and hoped
to tame them, they were never their masters.
Concerns over the Welsh language evident in the early 1980s became even
more pronounced after publication of census ﬁgures in 1981 showed a further
decline (to 18.9 per cent) in the number of Welsh speakers. There were two
immediate demands for legislation; both proposed a new and more demanding
Welsh Language Act with a statutory body to support and enforce such an act.
The ﬁrst proposal came from the Labour peer, Lord Prys Davies, in 1985 and the
second was a 10 minute bill to amend the 1967 Welsh Language Act, which was
introduced by Dafydd Wigley in 1986, the latter attracting cross-party support,
including Conservative MPs.
Prys Davies initially formed a working party to consider the position of the
Welsh language.69 Produced in 1985, the working party’s report identiﬁed some
66 ‘Note of a meeting held on 21 January 1980, Welsh Language Broadcasting’, www.walesoﬃ-
ce.gov.uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010; WO oﬃcial (name
redacted) to secretary of state, 9 Sept. 1980, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-
s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
67 ‘Private secretary Home Oﬃce to No. 10 Downing Street ’, 15 Sept. 1980, www.walesoﬃce.gov.
uk/2005/06/16/establishment-of-s4c-1979–81/, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
68 J. B. Jones and R. A. Wilford, Parliament and territoriality (Cardiﬀ, 1987), p. 42.
69 Its membership included Professor D. Jenkins, Dr G. O. Williams and Messrs Emrys Evans,
David Davies and Cyril Hughes.
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progress since the 1967 Act, but argued that the position of Welsh in ‘core areas ’
was a major concern.70 The working party met with the secretary of state and
proposed a standing ‘ language commission’ to ‘monitor progress ’, together with
legislation to secure oﬃcially supported amendments. When Welsh Oﬃce civil
servants had proposed a similar language commission in 1983, ministers had
rejected the idea, arguing it would ‘ lead down an uncharted road’.71 Edwards
was no more enthusiastic on this occasion. Referring explicitly to a Confederation
of British Industry (CBI) report on the costs that their working party’s proposals
would place on industry, he deemed such ideas unworkable and impracticable
and observed that legislation was not the best way forward. Roberts supported
this stance, arguing that ‘ the fate of the language depended on the use people
chose to make of it ’. Such proposals clashed with core Thatcherite concerns.
Shortly afterwards, Wigley produced his own language bill and the Welsh Oﬃce
sent the two sets of legislative proposals out to consultation. Welsh Oﬃce civil
servants played a substantial role in shaping the government’s response. Their
summary of opinion suggested the beneﬁts which a ‘positive Government lead
would bring ’, possibly in terms of undermining public interest in formal legis-
lation.72 The secretary of state started to support the formation of a committee to
advise on the Welsh language and on appropriate policies to maintain it.
Welsh Oﬃce civil servants pursued this line, rather than endorsing London’s
doubts or the claims of language activists. In October 1987, J. Walter Jones
suggested drawing up a list of what could be achieved ‘without legislation’,
either by the Welsh Oﬃce ‘or an external agency, e.g. a permanent Language
Commission/Language Council ’. More broadly, he suggested that ‘a more
co-operative attitude might be forthcoming if the Welsh Oﬃce indicates that it
proposes to act positively without legislation on a voluntary basis ’.73 A second
and equally inﬂuential civil servant, R. H. Jones, concluded that there was ‘ sig-
niﬁcant support for the Government to take some action’. In fact, Wyn Roberts
had evidently already decided that a ‘voluntary ’ and advisory council should be
established, that this body ‘could eventually be given a statutory basis ’, and that a
White Paper creating a new Language Act might follow.74 Roberts wanted to
ensure that moderate Welsh speakers – and inﬂuential elements within civil so-
ciety – were not radicalized by government ‘ indiﬀerence ’. Again, civil servants
deployed arguments that resonated well with Conservative concerns. Jones
70 This paragraph draws on the archives of the Welsh Language Board (WLB) and especially the
‘Note on a meeting at the WO, 23 Apr. 1985, to discuss demands for new language legislation’.
This material was examined at the WLB oﬃces in Cardiﬀ following an inquiry about access under
FOI. We are grateful to the Board for allowing unfettered access to its papers, which have now been
deposited in the National Library of Wales.
71 J. Walter Jones, ‘Welsh Language Study group’, 21 Nov. 1985, WLB papers.
72 WO, ‘Points made in favour of legislation’, n.d., papers released under FOI (in author’s pos-
session), EWL 1/2/8. 73 Ibid., J. Walter Jones, ‘Welsh language consultation’, 18 June 1987.
74 Ibid., Ceri Thomas, PS/secretary of state, to R. H. Jones, ‘Welsh language consultation’, 16 Oct.
1987; R. H. Jones to PS/secretary of state, 13 Oct. 1987.
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warned that ‘Ministers will wish to bear in mind the importance and inﬂuence of
the moderates … It is as well to remember that it was the alienation of this group
which created problems in the fourth channel debate. ’75
Historians should not, however, assume that what eventually occurred was
what Roberts and other Tories wanted, or was a consequence of civil servants’
own views, which are often hard to determine. A summary document by Roberts
recognized that the consultation had ‘raised widespread expectations of action ’,
but he did not automatically accede to such pressures. Indeed, he reported that
the consultation raised two classic Thatcherite concerns : ‘ the compulsion implicit
in the proposals and the unquantiﬁable cost of the implementation’. Roberts
argued not for an act of parliament backed by a statutory commission, but for an
advisory group that would meet a few times per year. This would be a ‘respon-
sible ’ and ‘controllable ’ body, comprising ‘ the heads of public bodies in Wales
who have an interest in the language … together with prominent people in the
private and voluntary sectors with a similar interest and sympathy’. Roberts also
emphasized the Conservative party’s achievements in education, and hoped
the media would now link such achievements in order to spread and sustain the
Welsh language. The resulting package ‘would go far towards reassuring the
majority of people in Wales that the Government is sincere in its commitment to
safeguard and promote the language. The extremists who will never be satisﬁed
in anything less that compulsory bilingualism, would be isolated further and the
middle ground secured. ’76
In the event, a committee of eight ‘wise men’, as it was reported in the media,
was put together, and met under the chairmanship of the minister of state.77 The
committee was not comprised of Tory stalwarts ; that would not have been
credible ; they were, however, ‘civic ’ patriots, with a history of working for the
public good. The committee started to investigate ways of improving the position
of the Welsh language and considered the role of a WLB and of legislation.
Despite Roberts’s wishes, it met monthly rather than occasionally. By its third
meeting, and orchestrated by John Elfed Jones (at the time chair of the Welsh
Water Authority), the committee’s demands were clearly tabulated : a language
unit within the Welsh Oﬃce and a permanent and funded commission to ‘begin
work immediately on creating a new framework for a new Language Act ’.
Thereafter, this independent commission would be ‘responsible for all Welsh
Oﬃce activity regarding the language ’,78 according with the role envisaged in
earlier legislative demands. Shortly afterwards, the committee was renamed the
75 Ibid., R. H. Jones memo to I. H. Lightman et al., 21 Nov. 1987, WLB papers.
76 Ibid., Wyn Roberts summary, ‘Current thinking on the Welsh language package’, 11 Jan. 1988,
WLB papers.
77 Daily Post, 21 July 1988; ‘Minutes of the minister of state’s working party on the Welsh language’,
25 Jan. 1988, papers released under FOI (in author’s possession), WO EWL 1/4/1. The members were
John Elfed Jones, D. Hugh Thomas, Prys Edwards, Tom Jones, Alun Daniel, Elfed Roberts, Euryn
Ogwen Williams, and Wyn Roberts.
78 ‘Minister of state’s working group, third meeting’, 28 Mar. 1988, WLB papers.
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Welsh Language Board and given a statutory role. Roberts had evidently sought
concrete action; but he had been pushed further than he had proposed. The result
was a direct contradiction of the Tories’ hostility to legislation and of previous
ministerial comments. From the start, the WLB also attracted media attention,
creating pressure from the ‘ fourth estate ’ as well as from within the civic elite.79
I V
The third plank of language policy was the introduction of compulsory Welsh
language teaching across Wales, initially largely conﬁned to the Welsh speaking
‘heartlands ’ in rural north-west and west Wales. Since these were also frequently
areas of English in-migration, compulsory Welsh language teaching became a
politically contentious issue. An arson campaign directed against second-home
owners in rural areas during the 1980s was part of a growing concern with the
decline of Welsh language and culture in these areas. Whilst the violence involved
did not attract much popular support, there was extensive local sympathy for
wider issues against which the action was targeted.80
The UK-wide Education Reform Act (1988), allowed the position of the Welsh
language in education to be addressed. The intentions behind the act accorded
well with a variety of Thatcher’s key concerns : strengthening increased choice
and parental responsibility, whilst assaulting an educational establishment which
included the Department of Education and Science (DES), trade unions, and
local authorities.81 The act was also used to make Welsh language education
compulsory in some areas. Wyn Roberts has correctly claimed that this outcome
had little to do with the protests of Welsh language campaigners, but instead was
attributable to Welsh educational organizations.82 Wales had established its own
Education Board in 1918 and had developed its own inspectorate and examin-
ation systems. This was a Welsh institution with Welsh views. Research based on
interviews with Welsh Oﬃce civil servants shows that such individuals quietly
asserted their separation from the DES, particularly in areas of jurisdiction (such
as the language) where there was a Wales-speciﬁc element. The chief inspector of
the Welsh inspectorate was strongly in favour of an enhanced role for the Welsh
language within a national curriculum.83 Such groups may have remained
stronger in Wales than in England, in the same way that Scottish trade unions
and other groups united in order to defend Scotland’s distinctive educational
79 See e.g. the front page story following the formation of the WLB, Daily Post, 21 July 1988, and the
two-page spread indicating the need for the group to have concrete powers, Daily Post, 2 Aug. 1988.
80 ‘Welsh issues: tabulation’, vol. 1 (Dec. 1988), NLW, un-catalogued Welsh election papers, NOP/
3767. We are grateful to Michelle Walker of Bangor University for this reference.
81 G. K. Fry, The politics of the Thatcher revolution (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 127–36.
82 Roberts, Right from the start, p. 234.
83 R. Daugherty and P. Elfed-Owen,’A national curriculum for Wales : a case study of education
policy-making in the era of administrative devolution’, British Journal of Educational Studies, 51 (2003),
pp. 242–4.
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system.84 Many English inspectors also accepted that the role of Welsh in the
curriculum was an issue that ‘ the Welsh had better sort out ’ themselves.85
The government accepted this outcome only reluctantly. Although
Thatcherites aimed to challenge the power of such groups, Wyn Roberts faced an
assault from Thatcher who felt ‘betrayed’ by his actions and those of civil
servants at the Department of Education. This was the genuine voice of the prime
minister, rather than that of her Welsh adviser, Lord Griﬃths. Roberts himself
narrowly evaded a ‘cosh from Margaret’s handbag’.86 Welsh Oﬃce oﬃcials felt
that, in the event, pragmatism dominated because the controversy over S4C had
created an increased sensitivity in all aspects of Welsh policy making. Even Wyn
Roberts was keen to set any requirement to teach Welsh at a low level in order
to defuse antagonism in non-Welsh speaking areas. This is politically under-
standable since there had been ﬂash points and conﬂicts in the 1970s when the
children of English in-migrants or other non-Welsh speakers had been obliged to
learn Welsh by local education authorities.87 Roberts had smoothed the way for
action by supporting exemptions where parents objected, arguing that a
Conservative belief in choice was being respected. Since this allowed English in-
migrants in areas like Pembrokeshire to opt out of local Welsh language schooling
at local expense, it provided a framework that led to dramatic and well-publicized
local conﬂicts, but which also helped persuade Thatcher to acquiesce.
The enthusiasm of educational bodies gained momentum because of the strong
compliance demonstrated from within civil society, as measured by the public
consultation conducted by the Welsh Oﬃce.88 Again, the Welsh Oﬃce defended
this case against other pressures, but any proposals to depart from the English
model required support from both the secretary of state and the cabinet.
Although Walker was convinced by Roberts of the need to act, Thatcher became
directly involved, and again raised a series of doubts. Roberts and Griﬃths were
called to the prime minister’s oﬃce to discuss the issue. Thatcher needed to be
persuaded that the proposals would not deter new companies from moving to
Wales, which was a key part of the Conservatives’ strategy for altering both the
economy and public attitudes. Roberts’s intervention was arguably vital in saving
the day. The desire to retain support amongst ‘middle Wales ’ and the cathartic
impact of the S4C debacle remained strong inﬂuences on ministerial attitudes.
The net result was an act which adapted ‘Thatcherite ’ ideas, in some small ways,
to Welsh circumstances, showing that ‘ traditional ’ and ‘new’ inﬂuences could
combine to inﬂuence policy content.
84 Stewart, The path to devolution and change, pp. 140–56.
85 Daugherty and Elfed-Owen, ‘A national curriculum’, p. 243.
86 Roberts, Right from the start, pp. 219–23.
87 C. Baker, Aspects of bilingualism in Wales (Clevedon, 1985), pp. 55–6; P. M. Rawkins, The im-
plementation of language policy in the schools of Wales (Glasgow, 1979), pp. 79–84, and G. E. Humphreys,
Heyrn yn y taˆn (Caernarfon, 2000), pp. 150–3.
88 Daugherty and Elfed-Owen, ‘A national curriculum’, p. 248.
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VThe ﬁnal element of Conservative policy was the passing of a Welsh Language
Act in 1993. This act gave Welsh a deﬁned role in the public sector, and gave
the WLB the task of policing it by spreading best practice and supporting fresh
developments. This was no part of a Thatcherite agenda or even a Welsh
Conservative one. On the contrary, when Thatcher was asked about a newWelsh
Language Act during a visit to Wales in June 1988, she responded by stating that
legislation was unnecessary, compulsion was fundamentally misguided, and that
the only real way to preserve the Welsh language was by people choosing to speak
it.89 When Wigley made an oﬃcial complaint at the tone of her response, the
manner of its handling revealed a good deal about Conservative opinion. The
Welsh Oﬃce drafted a letter stressing the ‘unfortunate ’ misinterpretation of the
prime minister’s comments by a hostile Welsh media. Thatcher’s oﬃce altered
both the tone and the context of the speech, adding a defence of government
policy and support given to the Welsh language. The reply to Wigley continued:
‘ to achieve objectives by voluntary means is far preferable to legislative compul-
sion. Indeed, I very much doubt whether legislative compulsion can ever be
eﬀective in ensuring the future of any language. ’90
Legislative intervention was thus hardly at the forefront of the party leader’s
instinctive thoughts on the position in Wales, despite being a clear aim of the new
WLB and some Tory backbenchers. When Welsh Oﬃce oﬃcials completed a
lengthy in-house consultation process in 1988, they too aimed at minimizing
support for legislative intervention. Their paper, ‘The Welsh Language – the
future ’, observed: ‘A greater degree of consensus about what is needed and is
acceptable and about practical measures for bringing it about could secure ac-
ceptance that legislation might not after all be needed in order to achieve most,
and perhaps all, of the desiderata now being identiﬁed ’.91 The paper, however,
also noted that idea of a new Language Act had ‘ lodged itself fairly ﬁrmly in the
Welsh psyche’. Once again, civil servants used arguments that played on Tory
fears of losing public support if proposals fell short of expectations. The paper
continued ‘We are probably past the point at which pure logic will pre-
vail … feeling at the moment is strongly reminiscent of the S4C aﬀair ’.92 The fear
of humiliation and defeat through the S4C aﬀair re-surfaced to promote con-
sideration of a positive approach to new proposals. The Conservatives’ shallow
political roots and limited intelligence-gathering abilities meant that they had
little sense of whether this assessment was correct.
89 Y Cymro, 16 June 1988.
90 WO draft reply to Mr Dafydd Wigley’s letter ; ‘Draft reply for the prime minister to send
to Dafydd Wigley’, n.d., 4 July 1988, WO website, FOI releases, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/welsh-
language-legislation, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
91 ‘The Welsh language: the future’, 8 Apr. 1988, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/welsh-language-
legislation, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
92 ‘The Welsh language: the future’, 27 Apr. 1988, www.walesoﬃce.gov.uk/welsh-language-
legislation, accessed on 7 Sept. 2010.
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Public opinion was thus a powerful lever, used by the WLB with some success.
Although the Conservative party had previously used polls extensively, and con-
tinued to do so at national level, other institutions were polling and not simply to
measure opinion. In the hands of newspapers and television programmes, polls
stimulated discussion, raised expectations, and generated an impression of pol-
itical and popular momentum. A similar situation had emerged in the 1960s and
1970s when devolution had been discussed.93 In 1979, the political scientist, Denis
Balsom, conducted a poll for HTV which had been used to identify levels of
support for Welsh programming, whilst Balsom had also been involved with
polling Welsh speakers on support for the arson campaign.94
Although the WLB alienated many language activists in being less strident than
some anticipated and by acting in concert with the government, it was hardly a
pliant government quango. Most of its leading ﬁgures were nationalists of some
form, although its legal spokesman, Winston Roddick, was a Liberal Democrat
whilst others were not politically active. When the Board’s chair John Elfed Jones,
was informed by Roberts and Walker that its proposed Welsh Language Act was
unlikely to succeed since many government departments would oppose it, Jones
simply refused to accept the point but instead worked within and outside
government to generate acceptance of the need for change.95 In 1988, for ex-
ample, the WLB worked with Balsom and National Opinion Polls (NOP) to
examine public attitudes to the Welsh language. The opinion poll had a wider
remit, since questions on devolution were carefully phrased in order to identify
responses to a mixture of complex options and scenarios, whilst questions on
language were less complex and more guided. The question on Welsh language
education, for example, asked only whether such education should be available to
all ; only 7 per cent disagreed. Two-thirds of those questioned supported bilingual
public services and a newWelsh Language Act. Support was spread evenly across
all parties and across both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers. Conservative
respondents were the least enthusiastic, although more than half were in favour,
whilst nearly 60 per cent of Liberals and over 70 per cent of Labour
voters supported the proposals, conﬁrming high levels of acceptance and support
overall.
Inevitably, the survey’s questions reveal nothing about the length to which
respondents were prepared to go to support their preferences. There was no
repetition of polls conducted in the 1960s to establish if these were choices that
people would prioritize. Although the polls supported a strategy for change, they
did not provide value-free evidence as some might assume. At this stage, the WLB
was not dominated by sophisticated approaches to language planning, but by
93 A. Edwards and D. Tanner, ‘Deﬁning or dividing the nation? Opinion polls, Welsh identity and
devolution, 1966–1979’, Contemporary Wales, 18 (2006), pp. 66–7.
94 Welsh cultural study, Gallup and HTV, Sept. 1979, NLW, Denis Balsom (Welsh opinion polls)
papers 3/1. For the arson campaign, Arcade, 20 Mar. 1981, and interview with Balsom 2009 (courtesy of
Michelle Walker, Bangor University). 95 Roberts, Right from the start, p. 235.
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advocacy and a desire to promote the cause of the Welsh language through more
moderate and constitutional channels than Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg
(the Welsh Language Society). Those who used the data generated by the polls
were apparently less concerned about statistical niceties. As the debate shifted to
address concerns of language planners, so too did questions used in other opinion
polls. By the early 1990s, an NOP poll for theWelsh language programme, ‘Y Byd
ar Bedwar ’ (‘The World on Four ’), asked about language use and transmission at
work, in family life, at the use of informal Welsh in the media, and the media’s
role in sustaining Welsh language use in homes.96
Whatever advocates of action claimed about public opinion, and the WLB said
about the need for intervention, the Conservatives did not leap into action. It took
a year for the WLB to receive a response to its ﬁrst proposal, in 1989, for a new
Welsh Language Act. It complained constantly that Welsh Oﬃce civil servants
were unenthusiastic about legislation, observing that Wyn Roberts remained to be
convinced that voluntary means were insuﬃcient. Many traditional Conservative
supporters, especially employers, were clearly unhappy about legislative change.
In February 1989, the director of the CBI in Wales declared the organization’s
support for propagating and encouraging the Welsh language, but stressed
the confederation’s concern at the ‘cost implications for industry and business ’
and the way in which compulsory provision for Welsh speakers would ‘cause
particular diﬃculties for immigrant industries and could deter potential overseas
investors ’. The CBI only supported a voluntary code of practice with ‘commer-
cial criteria ’ determining whether or not such a code should be adopted by in-
dividual companies.97
David Hunt, who succeeded Walker as secretary of state for Wales in 1990, was
an English MP with little knowledge of Wales and no ‘Welsh’ programme in
mind. By January 1991, Hunt had ‘not yet been convinced of the beneﬁts of an
all-encompassing piece of legislation’ on the Welsh language, which was a senti-
ment supported by the party’s north Wales organizer, D. Elwyn Jones, himself a
convinced Thatcherite and anti-nationalist.98 The climate was nonetheless
changing. By 1990, the Labour party was treading carefully. Doubts over local
authority language policies in south-west Wales were stiﬂed to produce a more
positive and ‘Welsh ’ Labour image.99 Hunt also sought to arrest his party’s de-
clining popularity in opinion polls and local elections by appealing to moderate
Welsh opinion. Whilst Plaid Cymru was less of an electoral threat than Labour,
96 St David’s Day poll, Feb. 1991, Balsom papers 3/1.
97 See, for example, I. Kelsall to John Walter Jones, 27 Feb. 1989, and the CBI’s ‘Welsh Language
Board – proposals for a Welsh Language Act by CBI Wales ’, June 1990, WLB papers.
98 D. Elwyn Jones, Y rebel mwyaf? (Caernarfon, 1991), p. 248.
99 The Labour MP AlunWilliams complained that Dyfed’s language policies were ‘ introduced with
a Stalinist authoritarianism’. A. Williams to W. J. Phillips, director of education in Dyfed, 1 June 1990,
CCC, KinnockMS, box 45. However, Labour’s working party on the Welsh language requested that a
document detailing such views ‘should not be distributed to the media’. Minutes of the Welsh lan-
guage working party, 2 Aug. 1990, NLW, Labour Party Wales Archive, File S25.
548 A ND R EW EDWA RD S E T A L.
both it and the Liberal Democrats had to be challenged if the Conservatives were
to preserve their shrinking electoral base.
Despite its rhetoric in opposition, the Conservative government had created
new boards and agencies to develop and administer various policy areas. In 1991,
for example, the secretary of state for Wales made 1,400 appointments to eighty
quangos. It was diﬃcult to ﬁnd reliable Conservative members in a country where
Conservatism was so weak, and where civil servants in London and Cardiﬀ had
only limited knowledge of individuals proposed for speciﬁc posts.100 Whilst
notions of a ‘democratic deﬁcit ’ played a major role in developing support for
devolution, in 1991–2, it was just one of many political problems facing a
Conservative party under siege. Establishing a quango to deliver a (moderate)
Welsh language policy was hardly out of step with the party’s approach, even
if the accompanying legislation which gave the quango considerable inﬂuence
represented a serious departure from Thatcherite principles.101 Wyn Roberts was
gradually converted to the WLB’s ideas, but felt that the Board’s leaders were
politically naı¨ve and ‘had no idea of what was involved in getting approval for a
legislative proposal within the government ’.102 Roberts’s own role was in facil-
itating the progress of such legislation, rather than initiating it, and also to ensure
that the party in London accepted the proposals.
Quangos – and Welsh civil society generally – were also important factors.
Civil servants found that organizations such as the Welsh Tourist Board and the
Farmers’ Union of Wales also supported change. Conservative members of
quangos could support a Welsh Language Act not as government loyalists, but as
members of an organization that had to play a diﬀerent, speciﬁcally Welsh, role
or risk its reputation. Several therefore ‘went native ’. Hunt’s civil servants em-
phasized the breadth of this support and played down the continuing opposition
of some local councils and the CBI. After such lobbying had started to take eﬀect,
the challenge, Wyn Roberts told the WLB in July 1991, was not to convince him
but ‘ to obtain support in Government, at all levels ’.103
The 1992 general election results further reduced the Conservative party’s
representation in Wales, whilst broader European trends may also have increased
pressures on the government to accommodate minorities. But the language
question was nevertheless accumulating a head of a steam, and Hunt himself
accepted that legislation was necessary. Despite his strong support for keeping the
Anglo-Welsh union intact, John Major, by now prime minister, did not react ‘as
100 Information supplied in conﬁdence.
101 K.Morgan andW. Roberts, The democratic deﬁcit : a guide to quangoland (Cardiﬀ, 1993), p. 56. For the
Tories’ publicly negative views of quangos in the 1970s, T. Stott, ‘ ‘‘Snouts in the trough’’ : the politics
of quangos’, Parliamentary Aﬀairs, 48 (1995), pp. 323–40. However, in private Kenneth Baker (and
others) felt that quangos were ‘manned by middle-class persons who were our supporters ’, and hence
were a useful tool. Machinery of Government Committee, 13 Jan. 1977, CCC, Thatcher
MS 2/6/1/49. 102 Roberts, Right from the start, p. 257.
103 Winston Roddick brief, n.d., and ‘Note on the minister’s meeting with the Welsh Language
Board’, 5 July 1991, WLB papers.
W E L S H L A N GU AG E R E V I EW 549
adversely as Margaret would have done’ to the proposal and apparently accepted
Roberts’s advice.104 The Welsh Language Act (1993) proclaimed the equal
validity of the Welsh language in public life and obliged public bodies to provide
all oﬃcial literature and other services both in Welsh and English. If this legis-
lation reﬂected the impact of Welsh civil society, including the WLB, it also
displayed the continuing role of more traditional elements in policy formation.
The CBI’s views on the need to avoid increased business costs were heeded, for
there was no attempt to apply the legislation in the private sector.
Even in the early 1990s, supporters of the original Thatcherite policy revolution
and its agenda of institutional change, had come to believe that the assault on
established policy groups had dissipated rapidly.105 When the Thatcherite, John
Redwood, became secretary of state for Wales in 1993 he found both the Welsh
Conservative party, and the Welsh policy process, a bitter disappointment. There
were no Tory think-tanks, few Tory intellectuals, and little commitment to
Thatcherite principles, as opposed to Thatcherite prejudices. His Welsh political
adviser has also claimed that Redwood saw the Welsh Conservatives as a ‘deca-
dent party ’, ‘weakened by government largesse ’ and dominated by ‘quango
crazy ’ sycophants.106 The Conservatives’ policy process had not, however, failed
to resist departures from Thatcherite principles, like the Welsh Language
Act, because of the weaknesses of party members.107 Rather, the institutional
mechanisms proposed by Thatcherites in opposition were suitable only for key
policy areas where people and organizations were available to assist. A govern-
ment that had alienated so many policy groups and which lacked any real
alternative source of support could hardly extend its reach into all areas of
national life.
V I
This article has focused speciﬁcally on the dynamics of Conservative policy
towards the Welsh language. Thatcherite aims were powerful inﬂuences on that
policy, even at the start of the period, when non-Thatcherites remained inﬂuen-
tial in the cabinet. British-wide subjects with a Welsh resonance, notably public
sector broadcasting and education, were introduced before and after the general
election in 1983, with British – and Thatcherite – concerns to the fore. Such in-
ﬂuences were, however, unable to neutralize traditional ‘Welsh’ policy networks
or to overcome the inﬂuence of either Welsh public opinion or Welsh civil society.
Accordingly Welsh Conservatives used such circumstances to moderate some
policies, rather than to present a ‘wet ’ alternative based on a distinctively Welsh
Tory vision or programme.
As the article suggests, the role of quangos – in Wales and elsewhere – merits
far more attention from historians of the 1980s than it has hitherto received, not
104 Roberts, Right from the start, p. 257. 105 Hoskyns, Just in time, pp. 387–402.
106 H. Williams, Guilty men (London, 1998), p. 51. 107 Ibid.
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least because the ‘new’ policy network established by the Tories after 1979
seemed no more compliant on some ‘second order ’ issues than its predecessor.
Similarly, the article exposes a government which was, at times, much more
pragmatic and susceptible to compromise than its many opponents and critics in
Wales may suggest. Even in a nation where the party did not enjoy signiﬁcant
success, electoral considerations, not least the party’s attempt to appease moder-
ate opinion whilst at the same time cutting one of the taproots of nationalism,
played a prominent role in moving forward the party’s Welsh agenda in unex-
pected directions.
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